Aims and scope

The first edition of the Logic for the Al Spring Summer School was held in 2022 and featured tutorials by Stephanie Dick, Alessandra Palmigiano, Josef Urban, and Mike Wooldridge.

Building on this success, the second edition, aims to bring together once again logicians and scientists working around and within the currently blossoming new Al Spring. The School revolves around the idea that logic, in addition to glorious past, has arguably a very bright future in shaping Al research and applications. Hence the School is designed to serve a twofold purpose: help early-stage researchers become aware of the logical heritage in AI, while giving them a basic training on the cutting edge logic-based AI research.

Special issue

We renewed our agreement with the international Journal of Approximate Reasoning for a Special lssue to follow up on the themes covered in the School

https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/international-journal-of-approximate-reasoning/about/call-for-papers#logics-for-the-new-ai-spring-2

School participants are particularly encouraged to submit their original research to the SI (the usual refereeing procedure applies to guarantee the highest scientific standards).

Workshop

This edition of Logic for the New AI Spring will host a workshop on New perspectives on formal representations of cognitive attitudes organised by E. Kubyshkina and C. Larese.

The workshop, which will take place on Wednesday 4 September, is focussed on the formal representation of the cognitive attitudes of agents, encompassing constructs such as knowledge, belief, and awareness, among others. The application of epistemic and doxastic logics in their diverse manifestations has demonstrated considerable utility in the representation of these cognitive states, thereby establishing a foundational framework for applications in automated reasoning, artificial intelligence, social choice theory, and many others. The extant literature has produced a range of approaches designed to harmonize logical systems with the epistemological prerequisites for knowledge and belief, with an emphasis on the alignment of these notions. Nevertheless, the mainstream methodologies often neglect inquiries related to other essential epistemic notions, such as ignorance, doubt, and suspension of judgement, as well as their manifestations in reasoning held by realistic agents. This tendency arises from a prevailing assumption that these notions can be adequately expressed in terms of knowledge and belief. The principal objective of this workshop is to engage in a discussion concerning the latest advancements in the domain of epistemic and doxastic logic, with a particular emphasis on cultivating alternative perspectives regarding epistemic notions.